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A TALE OF TWO DEBTORS:  
BANKRUPTCY DISPARITIES BY RACE 
Rory Van Loo*
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Legal policy has long struggled with the issue of official neutrality 
in the face of racially disparate results.  While the days of laws 
explicitly discriminating against people of color may be gone, the 
legal system as a whole has not attained perfect race neutrality.  
Scholars have offered evidence of this tension in disparate spheres 
such as criminal justice, employment, and education.  This paper 
adds to that history by offering evidence of racial difference in the 
court system in an area in which such differences had not been 
posited before: bankruptcy filings.  Such an addition to the debate is 
particularly timely given the current credit turmoil and heightened 
prominence of bankruptcy as a societal actor. 
When it amended the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) in 2005, 
Congress sought to curb perceived debtor “abuse” of bankruptcy 
laws by pushing more debtors out of Chapter 7 and into Chapter 
13.1  The amendments thus deny some debtors Chapter 7’s 
immediate and almost automatic2 cancellation of debts, and instead 
* Consultant, McKinsey & Co.  J.D., 2007, Harvard Law School.  Editor, Harvard Law 
Review, 2005-2007. I thank Professor Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law at 
Harvard Law School, for providing the initial vision for this empirical study and for her 
persistent guidance and feedback thereafter.  I am also grateful to Jennifer Dillon, 
Biostatistician, Georgetown Medical Center, for early help with the statistical analysis.  
1 See 151 CONG. REC. S1842 (daily ed. March 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch); U.S. 
Senate Republican Policy Committee, S. 256—The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, LEGISLATIVE NOTICE NO. 3, Feb. 28, 2005, at 1. 
2 Although bankruptcy judges have discretion to dismiss a Chapter 7 debtor for abuse, in 
practice this rarely happens.  Less than 1% of Chapter 7 cases are dismissed.  2001 
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT (on file with author) [hereinafter 2001 CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY PROJECT].  Additionally, there was no statistically significant difference among 
races in Chapter 7 dismissals.  Id.  The 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project is a large-scale 
longitudinal study led by professors at universities across the nation.  The project was made 
possible through funding from the Ford Foundation, as well as grants from Harvard Law 
School and New York University Law School.  The statistical calculations referenced in this 
article were calculated from data found in the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project.  These 
calculations were retained by the author and may be obtained from the author upon written 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353716 
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thrust them into a Chapter 13 that requires the debtor to make 
exacting payments to creditors over a period of up to five years.3  In 
so doing, Congress may have exacerbated racial disparity in 
bankruptcy relief. 
The data from this paper suggest that minorities who enter 
bankruptcy are far less likely than whites to receive a bankruptcy 
discharge.  Part of this is simply because of the choice that debtors 
make.  Black debtors, for example, are three times more likely to 
choose Chapter 13 than are white debtors.4  Because the overall 
relief rate was only 23% for Chapter 13,5 this means that blacks are 
disproportionately denied relief based on the bankruptcy chapter 
they choose. 
More worrisome is that the empirical data in this paper suggest 
that once minorities enter Chapter 13, they obtain bankruptcy relief 
far less often than do whites—the odds of a discharge are 40% lower 
for black or Hispanic debtors as compared to white ones, even after 
controlling for income, education, and employment.6  In other 
words, Congress’s recent amendments7 have made it so that some 
minority debtors will no longer have the option of an immediate 
Chapter 7 discharge in which all races fare the same,8 and must 
instead enter a long-term payment Chapter 13 in which their race 
may be a determining factor in whether they ever get a successful 
discharge. 
A numbers-based discussion of minority debtors’ likelihood of 
relief is new to bankruptcy scholarship, and fills in the middle part 
of the three-part story of race in bankruptcy law.9  Scholars have 
already shown that black and Hispanic families are far more likely 
request.  For further discussion of the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project see ELIZABETH 
WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP (2004). 
3 See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 281–82, 326 (5th ed. 2006) (explaining that Chapter 13 bankruptcy requires 
debtors to make payments based on “projections of future income and living expenses,” which 
often fail to reflect real life occurrences). 
4 P < .01.  P is a measure of statistical significance.  If P < .05 then it is considered 
statistically significant.   
5 This number comes from the percentage of all debtors who filed for Chapter 13 and 
eventually obtained a discharge.  See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2. 
6 After controlling for income, education, homeownership, and employment, this odds ratio 
held statistical significance (P < .01 for blacks and P < .1 for Hispanics).  See 2001 CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2. 
7 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
8 See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2. 
9 A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725, 1726–
27 (2004) [hereinafter Dickerson, Race Matters]. 
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to enter bankruptcy than are white families.10  At least one critical 
factor in this seems to be predatory lending practices: even 
residents in high-income, predominately black neighborhoods are 
more than twice as likely to get subprime mortgages as are 
residents in low-income white neighborhoods.11  Scholars have also 
posited that the type of relief offered by bankruptcy laws favors 
white debtors over black debtors, since whites disproportionately 
own the type of assets that bankruptcy protects, and blacks 
disproportionately have the types of debts that bankruptcy does not 
relieve.12  This would leave minority debtors who obtain relief worse 
off than white debtors who obtain relief.  Thus, the literature offers 
a picture of different races before and after bankruptcy.  The data 
presented in this paper begin to tell the story of what happens to 
minority debtors while they are in bankruptcy—which chapter they 
choose and what happens to them while they are pursuing a 
discharge of their debts in Chapter 13. 
This paper thus informs the relationship between bankruptcy and 
race and, as such, fleshes out some larger issues surrounding race 
and the law.  Until now, that debate lacked empirical information 
about what happens to different races once in bankruptcy.  It also 
lacked any clear assertion that race played a role in whether a 
debtor received a discharge.  Indeed, much of the criticism of “raced” 
bankruptcy laws seemed understandably premised on the 
assumption of equal availability of a discharge.13  The data offered 
in this paper refute that assumption. 
II.  METHODOLOGY AND CORE FINDINGS 
The data for this paper comes from the 2001 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project, whose final completion rates for Chapter 13 
10 Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, 
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1777, 1779 (2004) [hereinafter Warren, Economics of Race]. 
11 Id. at 1779, 1795.  Professor Warren mentions several potential contributors to this 
greater vulnerability to financial collapse.  Blacks and Hispanics may have “more pervasive 
job difficulties and more trouble financing medical care.”  Id. at 1779.  The problem is also 
likely intertwined with the fact that racial minorities are “singled out for predatory loans and 
other subprime credit that drain billions of dollars out of the pockets of these families and 
push them into financial collapse.”  Id. 
12 See A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, 71 MO. L. REV. 919, 937, 
956 (2006) [hereinafter Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform]; Dickerson, Race Matters, supra note 
8, at 1726. 
13 See Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 11, at 925, 937 (stating that “Everyone 
who files for bankruptcy generally receives some debt relief. . . .” and “[t]here is . . . no reason 
to believe that . . . courts interpreted the pre-BAPCPA Code in a way that favored whites”). 
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cases only recently became available because a significant portion of 
the multi-year Chapter 13 repayment plans were not completed 
until 2006 and 2007. 
The Chapter 13 database used in this paper has a core sample of 
978 debtors, while the Chapter 7 database has 801 debtors.14  The 
information about these debtors came from two principal 
information sources.  First, debtors received questionnaires at their 
mandatory meetings with creditors.15  These questionnaires asked 
for demographic information such as race, level of education, and 
whether the debtor owned a home and was employed.16  Then, 
coders collected data from the corresponding public court records.17  
These records supplied additional information about income, 
bankruptcy outcome, and motions made against the debtor in court. 
Overall, 69.1% of blacks who entered bankruptcy in 2001 
eventually obtained a discharge, compared to 87.5% of whites.18  
Part of this is explained by the fact that blacks chose Chapter 13 
with much higher frequency than did whites and Hispanics: of those 
debtors choosing Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 61.8% of 
blacks chose Chapter 13, compared to 29.4% of Hispanics and 20.5% 
of whites.19   
Yet an analysis of this data also revealed a discrepancy among 
debtors only entering Chapter 13.  Significantly fewer blacks and 
Hispanics who entered Chapter 13 left with a successful discharge 
of debts, even controlling for the influence of income, education, and 
employment.  Whereas, 28.3% of all whites entering bankruptcy 
obtained a discharge, only 19.8% of blacks and 19.4% of Hispanics 
did.20  In other words, merely being black lowers the odds of getting 
14 See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2. 
15 See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 81 (2006). 
16 See id.  To view the questionnaire form used in the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
see Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1028–32 (2002). 
17 See Porter & Thorne, supra note 13, at 81. 
18 P < .01 for the difference between blacks and whites, but data were not statistically 
significant for the difference between Hispanics and whites.  See 2001 CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2.  These numbers were obtained by normalizing to 
account for the reality that there were nearly three times as many people who entered 
Chapter 7 as Chapter 13 in 2001.  See Ed Flynn et al., A Tale of Two Chapters: Financial 
Data, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2002, at 20. 
19 See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2. 
20 Using a Z test (a comparison of sample and population means to determine whether 
significant differences exist), this data was statistically very significant for blacks, with P = 
.0025, and was significant for Hispanics, with P = .042.  Running a logistic regression model 
(a model used for prediction of the probability of occurrence of an event by fitting data into a 
logistic curve) in Stata (a type of statistical analysis software program) and removing biracial 
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Even after a judge approves the debtor’s proposed repayment 
plan, and thus gives the court’s seal of approval for feasibility, the 
disparity still exists between blacks and whites.  Of whites who had 
their plans confirmed, 39% wound up receiving a discharge, 
compared to 28.6% of blacks, again even after controlling for 
income, homeownership, education, and employment.22  Hispanics 
who had their plan confirmed had a completion rate of 27.7%.23
 
pairings, this data was statistically very significant for blacks, with P = .003, and was 
moderately significant for Hispanics, with P = .07.  These significance levels held even after 
controlling for income, education level, homeownership, and employment.  Although the 
sample size for Hispanics was still moderately significant upon running the logistic 
regression, its diminished p-value likely reflects the fact that the total sample size for 
Hispanics was small (93, compared to 318 whites and 500 blacks).  That small size made the 
group of Hispanics more sensitive to adjusting for biracial attributions and controlling for 
socioeconomic factors.  See id.  
21 The decreased odds of receiving a discharge were calculated in Stata using a logistic 
regression model, which yielded an odds ratio of .604 for blacks and .57 for Hispanics.  See id. 
22 (P = .01).  This significance level was obtained by running a logistic regression model in 
Stata.  See id. 
23 (P = .1).  Because of the smaller sample size for Hispanics, shrinking the sample size by 
eliminating those who had their plan dismissed prior to confirmation made the data for 
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III.  CAUSES 
There are a number of possible contributors to the difference in 
completion rates.  The discussion below focuses on the difference in 
completion rates within Chapter 13, rather than the choice between 
chapters, because the Consumer Bankruptcy Database offered a 
broader explanation for the Chapter 13 differences. 
As far as the differences in completion rates within Chapter 13 
are concerned, data and common-sense point to three principal 
explanatory avenues.  The first is that actors in the bankruptcy 
system—judges, attorneys, or otherwise—are treating whites and 
minorities differently.  A second potential explanation is a racial 
bias built into the Chapter 13 laws.  Finally, there is the possibility 
that social factors, independent of debtors’ socioeconomic status, 
offer less support to minorities, such as through inadequate 
representation. 
A.  Bankruptcy Actors 
One explanation for the disparate completion rates is that actors 
in the system—such as trustees, judges, or attorneys—are treating 
minorities differently.  This treatment is difficult to gauge because 
we cannot know with certainty what is going on in the minds of 
these actors.  Thus, the discussion below is limited to those actors 
for whom the numbers demonstrated a difference in involvement: 
trustees and attorneys.24
1.  Trustees 
One way treatment of debtors can be measured is through the 
number of adversarial moves made against them by other parties.  
In a bankruptcy case, the strongest adversarial move to make is a 
motion to dismiss, which can be made by the debtor, creditors, or 
the trustee at any time during the bankruptcy proceedings.25  The 
data on motions to dismiss support the assertion that some of the 
race differences in completion rates might be explained by 
differences in the number of motions to dismiss made by third 
Hispanics only slightly significant.  This significance level was obtained by running a logistic 
regression model in Stata.  See id. 
24 No statistical significance was found for differential measures of judicial participation in 
the bankruptcy process, even though the data provided information on numbers, such as the 
percentage of motions granted.  See id. 
25 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 282; 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (2006). 
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parties.26  The principal party making those motions was the 
trustee. 
A significantly higher percentage of discharged black debtors 
(30.3%) than white debtors (17.8%)27 were subjected to motions to 
dismiss.28  This means that on average, even successful black 
debtors had 12.5% more motions to dismiss made against them.  
Although the specific details of the motions are unknown, the 
difference is striking when one considers the comparable 
socioeconomic demographics of the groups and that such motions 
were made against ultimately successful debtors.  Not only should 
these racial groups theoretically have had comparable motions to 
dismiss made against them, but it would also appear that any such 
motions to dismiss were ultimately off base because the debtors 
completed the plans. 
Nor can these motions to dismiss be defended on the ground that 
they were made to encourage the debtor to make payments.  The 
above motions to dismiss were motions that the court actually ruled 
on.  Moving parties can—and often do—withdraw the motions to 
dismiss on the day of the hearing if their intent is to prod the debtor 
into payment.  The fact that judges actually ruled on these motions, 
however, suggests the trustees made the motions with intent to 
remove the debtor from Chapter 13. 
Because motions to dismiss can be made by many parties—
26 Coders for the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project did not count all motions made, but 
rather whether one of a given type of motion was made.  Thus, if three motions to dismiss 
were made by trustees against a particular debtor, such would be coded as a motion to 
dismiss having been made by a trustee, but would not be counted as three separate motions.  
Also, only motions that were ruled on were included.  Frequently, trustees or other parties 
made motions to dismiss and then, at the hearing, withdrew such motions because of 
something the judge or more likely the debtor said.  It would be informative, in a future 
study, to record the withdrawn motions since these likely have a coercive effect on the 
debtors.  Moreover, repeated motions by certain players would suggest a heightened level of 
aggression.  The categories of motions to dismiss counted in the current database were those 
made by the trustee, the mortgage lender, the car lender, a child support/alimony creditor, 
other creditor, debtor, and unknown movant.  None of the discharged debtors had a motion to 
dismiss made by the debtor, so the results discussed in the text reflect motions to dismiss 
made by third parties.  See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2. 
27 P = .025 (N = 30 for discharged black debtors subjected to a motion, and N = 16 for 
whites.  “N” represents the data/sample size).  This significance value was attained using a 
one-sided Z test.  See id. 
28 The examination of motions to dismiss was limited to discharged debtors because almost 
every dismissed debtor had a motion to dismiss made against him—that is how the debtor’s 
case was dismissed.  The data supports this logical inference: 99% of dismissed black and 
white debtors had at least one motion to dismiss made against them and 100% of dismissed 
Hispanic debtors had at least one motion to dismiss made against them.  One unfortunate 
consequence of focusing on discharged debtors is that the sample size for Hispanic discharged 
debtors, eighteen, was too small for a significant statistical analysis.  See id. 
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mortgage holders, credit card companies, or the trustee29—it helps 
to take a closer look at who made these motions in the data set.  The 
motions were spread out enough among different types of creditors 
so that no single category of creditors had enough of a sample size to 
draw any conclusion.  One party had, however, made enough 
motions to dismiss to provide a significant enough sample size: 
trustees.  Trustees made at least one motion to dismiss against 
22.2% of discharged black debtors, but against only 11.1% of white 
debtors.30  Trustees thus were twice as likely to make a motion to 
dismiss against a black debtor who ultimately completed her plan 
than against a similarly-positioned white debtor. 
29 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (2006) (giving any party in interest or the trustee the authority 
to request dismissal “for cause”). 
30 P = .02 (N = 22 for discharged black debtors subjected to a motion, and N = 10 for 
whites).  This significance value was attained using a one-sided Z test.  See 2001 CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2. 
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Considering the amount of discretion a trustee has, one reading of 
the above data is that trustees handle black debtors more 
aggressively than they do white debtors.  Trustees’ responsibilities 
in Chapter 13 create many opportunities to influence the outcome of 
cases.  The Chapter 13 trustee recommends approval or denial of 
the plan, and then is charged with assuring that the debtor 
relinquishes the required amount of income during the repayment 
period.31  If the debtor falls behind, the trustee will usually take 
steps such as asking the court for a wage garnishment or making a 
motion to dismiss.32
Bankruptcy courts and the Code give trustees a great amount of 
 
31 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(2)(B), (b)(3), (b)(5) (2006). 
32 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 282. 
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discretion in decisions such as whether or not a motion to dismiss 
should be filed.  Case law has established that “the United States 
trustee has complete discretion in determining whether and how to 
act to advance the goals of case management.”33  The trustee also 
has “prosecutorial discretion” not to file the motion to dismiss.34  
The Code’s language contributes to the trustee’s discretion by 
saying that the trustee “shall . . .  if advisable, oppose the discharge 
of the debtor.”35  Yet what is meant by “advisable” is unclear. 
Other explanations for these data are less convincing.  The 
strongest alternative explanation is that independent factors caused 
black debtors to miss payments more frequently than white debtors.  
These missed payments, in turn, caused the trustees to move to 
dismiss.  Missed payments could have been caused by external 
shocks to the debtors’ lives, such as loss of employment—one could 
postulate that such events happen more often to blacks than to 
whites due to social prejudice or some other reason.   
Alternatively, the aforementioned treatment of expenses by some 
courts—by not allowing for support of nonlegal dependents—could 
cause blacks to miss payments more often.  That is, perhaps a 
greater percentage of black debtors were supporting nonlegal 
dependents, thus making their actual expenses higher than both 
their allowed expenses and whites’ actual expenses.  If that 
treatment caused even ultimately successful black debtors to have 
greater hardships during their repayment plans, it could have led to 
subsequent motions to dismiss. 
Yet these hypotheses of trustees’ disparate motion rates are 
unlikely for several reasons.  First, debtors and trustees can account 
for external shocks on the debtor’s life, such as a job loss or 
demotion, by making a motion to modify the repayment plan.36  If 
external turbulence happened more frequently in discharged black 
debtors’ lives, then one would expect to see more motions to modify 
made by black debtors seeking breathing room.  The data do not, 
however, support this assertion.  Among discharged debtors, there 
was no difference between the races in the frequency of motions to 
33 Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 308 (1993); see, e.g., In re Erwin, 376 B.R. 897, 
902 (Bankr. C. D. Ill. 2007) (indicating that Chapter 13 trustees have broad discretion in plan 
administration); In re Passis, 235 B.R. 562, 564 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999) (stating that the 
decision to file a motion to dismiss, in a Chapter 7 case, is within the discretion of the United 
States trustee). 
34 See In re Duffus, 339 B.R. 746, 748 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006).  
35 11 U.S.C. §704(a)(6) (2006). 
36 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 326 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (2006)).  
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modify, although the numbers are small so this fact is merely 
suggestive.37
Moreover, if a debtor were making late payments, there would 
normally be some communication between the debtor and trustee, 
as the trustee appraises the situation.  If the debtor were struggling 
to make the payments because of a need to support non-dependent 
family members, a reasonable trustee would probably consider this 
situation before attempting to jettison the debtor’s chances of a 
fresh start.  Combined with the fact that these debtors had 
comparable socioeconomic demographics and ultimately completed 
their plans, the information about motions to modify makes it 
highly unlikely that differences in frequencies of external shocks on 
white and black debtors’ lives explains the difference in motions to 
dismiss. 
There also does not appear to be any one geographic area 
accounting for the difference in trustee motions to dismiss.  The 
trustees’ motions to dismiss were spread throughout four of the five 
states studied in the data set.38  While a larger data set would be 
necessary to study the full effects of geography on trustees’ rates of 
motions to dismiss, the data in the current study suggest the 
disparity in trustee motions is not limited to any one geographic 
area. 
37 8.1% of blacks (N = 8) and 13.3% of whites (N = 12) made a motion to modify their plans.  
See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2.  
38 See Figure 3.  The 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project studied debtors from one district 
in each of five states.  The total motions against black debtors in each of these states was 
spread out: Pennsylvania (8), Texas (6), Illinois (5), and Tennessee (3).  In California, the only 
state not mentioned, none of the four discharged white debtors or two discharged black 
debtors was subjected to a motion to dismiss by a trustee.  See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
PROJECT, supra note 2. 
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Although the data are consistent with trustee bias, any such 
conclusion would be premature and should await further studies on 
trustees and race in bankruptcy.  The data are also consistent with 
other interpretations, such as blacks living disproportionately in 
districts where the trustees are more likely to make motions to 
dismiss. 
2.  Attorneys  
Attorneys wield considerable influence over the outcome of a case.  
When a debtor falls behind, lawyers can often work with the trustee 
to prevent a motion to dismiss the case.39  And studies have 
 
39 See, e.g., Michael J. Macco, Chapter 13 Trustee, 
http://macco.lawoffice.com/CustomPage.shtml#25 (last visited Sept. 29, 2008); Avoiding Stress 
in Court, www.atlanta-bankruptcy-attorney.com/html/avoiding_stress_in_court.html (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2008); John E. Smith, What Happens Next?, 
http://johnesmithlawoffice.com/what_happens_next (last visited Sept. 29, 2008). 
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consistently established that “the key actor in each consumer 
bankruptcy is the debtor’s lawyer.”40  Lawyers principally 
contribute to the difference in the completion rates by whether they 
choose to represent and how well they represent minorities. 
Lack of legal representation likely explains some of the disparity 
in completion rates.  The numbers for Chapter 13 support the 
inference that black and Hispanic debtors were less often 
represented and that this lack of representation contributed to 
lower completion rates.  Whereas 98.4% of dismissed white 
debtors41 had attorneys, only 94.8% of blacks and 94% of Hispanics 
had attorneys.42  These rates of representation differ starkly from 
successful debtors: every single one of the 207 black, Hispanic, and 
white debtors who obtained a discharge were represented by an 
attorney.43
91%
92%
93%
94%
95%
96%
97%
98%
99%
Blacks Hispanics Whites
Figure 4: Percent of Dismissed Debtors Represented by an Attorney
 
 
40 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 355. 
41 Dismissed debtors include those who had their cases dismissed either before or after 
confirmation. 
42 This difference in representation was significant for blacks (P = .02, N = 349) and 
Hispanics (P = .03, N = 63).  These significance values were calculated using a one-sided Z 
test and the corresponding table for normal distribution.  See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
PROJECT, supra note 2. 
43 See id. 
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A reasonable inference from these numbers is that a lack of 
representation contributed to the failure to obtain a discharge.  
Besides improving a debtor’s chances during the bankruptcy 
proceedings, attorneys play a key role in deciding whether the 
debtor even files for bankruptcy in the first place.  Although the 
debtor “has the ultimate right to decide, [because of] the complexity 
of the bankruptcy system, . . . the lawyer has an overwhelming 
influence over the decisions of most clients to file or not and which 
chapter to choose.”44  Thus, it could be that some of the black and 
Hispanic debtors who filed and did not have their plans confirmed 
would have been wisely advised not to file. 
Because the difference in representation is only about 4%,45 this 
factor explains only part of the difference in completion rates.  Even 
if only represented debtors are considered, white debtors still have a 
significantly higher completion rate (28.7%) compared to their black 
counterparts (20.6%).46  Lack of attorney representation thus must 
be combined with other factors—such as quality of representation, 
trustee bias, or the structure of bankruptcy laws—to obtain a full 
picture of why black and Hispanic debtors fare worse in Chapter 13. 
The other major way in which attorney representation could 
contribute to the disparate completion rates is through the quality 
of representation.  Yet the data from the current study regarding 
quality of representation are inconclusive.  Probably the most 
objective factor that would allow for a comparison of the quality 
level of the attorneys is their experience level.  At least one 
governmental study has linked the experience level of attorneys to 
the chance of a debtor having her Chapter 13 plan confirmed and 
attaining a discharge.47
Although experience level was not known for the attorneys in the 
current study, one potential proxy for experience level is how much 
debtors paid for their attorney.  The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct requires attorneys to charge only reasonable fees, and one 
measure of reasonableness is attorney experience.48  Interestingly 
enough, those black, Hispanic, and white debtors who were 
44 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 355. 
45 See Figure 4; see also 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2. 
46 P = .005.  This significance value was attained using a one-sided Z test by plugging the 
numbers into the Z test formula, which yielded a 2.55.  This number was then looked up on a 
normal Z test table to attain the p value.  See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra 
note 2. 
47 HÜLYA K. ERASLAN ET AL., THE REALITIES OF PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER CHAPTER 
13 19 (2006), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2006/oct/eraslan_li_sarte_pres.pdf. 
48 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(7) (2008). 
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represented paid comparable amounts to their attorneys: blacks on 
average paid $1,495, whites paid $1,465, and Hispanics paid 
$1,446.49  Thus, to the extent the price reflects the quality of the 
attorney, there is no support for an inference that the attorneys 
representing minority debtors are any less qualified than those 
representing whites.  Alternatively, it could turn out that whites are 
receiving a higher quality of representation through more 
experienced attorneys, and that Hispanics and blacks are simply 
paying too much for their representation.  But absent more data, 
there is no reason to suspect this. 
B.  Social Factors 
A third potential source of causes of the disparity in completion 
rates—though the least convincing—is social factors.  That is, 
perhaps something external to bankruptcy happens to blacks and 
Hispanics more frequently than to whites and makes it more 
difficult for them to complete their repayment plans.  This 
explanation is tempting because the main avenue for dismissal of a 
case is through a motion to dismiss for failure to make the 
payments promised in the original plan.50  Thus, one could argue 
that blacks and Hispanics simply fall behind more frequently on 
their payments.  Both a statistical analysis of the data set and a 
legal analysis of Chapter 13, however, provide strong arguments 
why standard socioeconomic factors—income, education level, 
employment, and homeownership—do not explain the difference in 
completion rates. 
1.  Statistical Makeup of the Debtors  
From a statistical standpoint, debtors entering Chapter 13 are 
mostly middle class Americans who have run into income 
problems.51  Most own homes, have middle class jobs—as gauged by 
occupational prestige score—and have some college education.52  
49 See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2. 
50 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 326. 
51 See Warren, Economics of Race, supra note 9, at 1781 (describing middle class families 
as the majority filing for bankruptcy when looking at factors such as “education, occupation, 
and homeownership”). 
52 Among families filing for bankruptcy, 70% held jobs in the fiftieth percentile of 
occupational prestige.  See Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes 
Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 134 n.39, 135 fig.6 (2003) [hereinafter Warren, 
Financial Collapse]. 
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Moreover, income and indices of class for Chapter 13 debtors are 
comparable for blacks, Hispanics, and whites.  Most notably, the 
groups have essentially no difference in terms of income: whites 
($2,273) have a slightly higher average monthly total income than 
Hispanics ($2,204) and blacks ($2,171), but these differences are not 
statistically significant.53  Using the median income makes 
Hispanics the highest income group (higher than whites by about 
$70).  Income by itself does not predict whether a debtor will be 
successful in Chapter 13. 
Among debtors entering Chapter 13, homeownership was high: 
92.5% of Hispanics, 89.6% of blacks, and 84.2% of whites were 
homeowners.54  Education level followed a similar trend: out of a 
high of eight (advanced degree) and a low of one (no schooling), 
black debtors were the best-educated (5.5 average), followed by 
whites (5.2) and Hispanics (4.7).55  This meant that the average 
black and white debtor had some college education, whereas the 
average Hispanic had a high school education.  Hispanics, on the 
other hand, were the group most likely to be employed (90.3%), 
followed by whites (83.9%) and blacks (83.1%).56
These data suggest that there is no reason why socioeconomic 
factors would favor whites over blacks and Hispanics in Chapter 13.  
If anything, the data suggest that blacks and Hispanics had higher 
socioeconomic status, since they have comparable incomes but 
blacks have higher education levels and both Hispanics and blacks 
are more likely to own homes and have a job.  Unsurprisingly, given 
the similarity of these numbers, none of the above factors 
contributed statistically to the difference in completion rates. 
2.  Bankruptcy’s Level Field  
Another reason why it would make sense that factors such as 
income would not lead to different completion rates is that Chapter 
13 requires debtors to pay all “disposable income” to the repayment 
53 See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2.  A T test—a test that 
determines whether differences between samples reflect actual differences between the 
populations from which they were drawn, or alternatively, merely random differences 
suggestive of similar populations—in Stata revealed that the difference is not significant 
between whites and blacks (P = .24), and between whites and Hispanics (P = .71).  See id.  
These figures were adjusted for outliers because one white debtor’s income was either entered 
mistakenly or the group contained a millionaire debtor, either of which would throw off group 
measures of central tendency.   
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
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plan.57  Disposable income is income that is not “reasonably 
necessary” to support the debtor or the debtor’s dependants.58  
While there is plenty of leeway for what counts as reasonably 
necessary, there are also basic limits on what can and cannot be 
counted as expenses and a basic idea of what an average person 
would need to pay for support.  The effect of comparing these limits 
to a debtor’s income is that it doesn’t matter whether the debtor 
earns $50,000 per month or $3,000 per month; the reasonably 
necessary expenses will take up a portion and then the rest will go 
toward plan payments.  Consequently, each debtor would 
theoretically have the same amount of breathing room.59  Chapter 
13 plans thus, theoretically, level the playing field regardless of 
income, and this would explain why even debtors of different income 
levels should be expected to have similar completion rates. 
C.  Structure of the Laws 
One possible explanation for the difference in completion rates is 
that something in the way Chapter 13 laws are drafted puts 
minorities at a disadvantage.  Scholars have posited race bias in 
what would otherwise appear to be neutral laws—such as the 
Internal Revenue Code.60  Mechele Dickerson has applied this line 
of thought to the Bankruptcy Code and found many elements of the 
Code to be problematic.61
The structure of Chapter 13 may disadvantage minority debtors 
because of the conflicting interpretations of “disposable income” 
among some bankruptcy courts.62  Some courts refuse to exclude 
expenses for “nonlegal dependents” such as “parents, adult children, 
grandchildren, [and] domestic partners.”63  This interpretation 
could disproportionately hurt blacks and Hispanics more than other 
groups because “[t]he rearing or informal adoption of children by 
57 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(4) (2006); see Dickerson, Race Matters, supra note 8, at 1728. 
58 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2006); see Dickerson, Race Matters, supra note 8, at 1728. 
59 Which is to say, very little breathing room; that may be one big reason why completion 
rates are so low. 
60 See generally Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751 (1996) (examining the Internal Revenue Code through 
the lens of critical race theory and concluding that members of the black community receive, 
on average, fewer of the tax benefits received by the average member of the white 
community).
61 See generally Dickerson, Race Matters, supra note 8, at 1743–71 (examining racial bias 
within the Bankruptcy Code). 
62 See id. at 1728. 
63 Id. at 1728–29; see also id. at 1729 n.13 (citing numerous case law examples). 
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members of their extended family” is more prevalent than among 
other racial groups.64  Thus, more Chapter 13 black debtors would 
have hidden costs not accounted for by the repayment plan.  The 
debtor would then be faced with a difficult choice between providing 
for these informal children and meeting the expected payments.  To 
the extent that this happens, it would be understandable why the 
debtor would choose to continue providing for nonlegal dependents 
and thus be unable to meet their Chapter 13 payments—essentially, 
the court would have overestimated the debtor’s truly “disposable 
income.”65
While raced bankruptcy laws is one viable explanation, more 
empirical support would be needed before drawing any conclusions 
about its contribution to completion rates.  It may be true that 
blacks and Hispanics in general provide more support for nonlegal 
dependents, but that does not mean this is the case for Chapter 13 
debtors, given that the socioeconomic makeup of Chapter 13 debtors 
is different in relevant ways from the population as a whole.  For 
example, in 2005, the U.S. Census calculated the median income of 
blacks as $30,858, Hispanics as $35,967, and whites as $48,554.66  
Yet, as mentioned above, differences in incomes of Chapter 13 
debtors were not statistically significant.  Thus, before concluding 
that the laws themselves explain a significant portion of the 
difference in completion rates, it should be established that the 
above generalities about minorities in the studies on raced 
bankruptcy laws (that they support more nonlegal dependent 
relatives) hold true for Chapter 13 debtors. 
D.  Effects on Choice of Chapter 
Although the data are more limited in explaining the racial 
differences in chapter choice, they do offer some further information 
relating to potential causes.  One possible explanation is that 
minority homeowners place greater importance on holding onto 
their homes, and thus seek to enter Chapter 13 to do so.  While 64% 
of white homeowners chose Chapter 13, 88% of black homeowners 
and 81% of Hispanic homeowners chose Chapter 13.67
64 Id. at 1746. 
65 11 U.S.C. 1325(b)(2) (2006); see also Dickerson, Race Matters, supra note 8, at 1728. 
66 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 6 (2006), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf. 
67 See 2001 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT, supra note 2. 
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Another possibility is that black debtors are not receiving 
competent legal representation, and thus might not be as informed 
about how difficult it actually is to obtain a discharge and hold onto 
one’s home in Chapter 13.  To do justice to this question, further 
studies would be needed to examine the competence of bankruptcy 
attorneys and related services or advertisements that would inform 
communities about bankruptcy.  The data do reveal that black and 
Hispanic debtors choosing Chapter 7 are less likely to be 
represented by attorneys, at about 85%, compared to about 93% of 
white Chapter 7 debtors being represented by attorneys.68  This 
discrepancy suggests that legal representation and the information 
that comes along with such representation could contribute to the 
difference in choice. 
Another hypothesis would be that perhaps economic 
considerations help determine chapter choice.  The numbers do not 
support such an inference; the differences in chapter choice are still 
significant independent of income level.69  Nor do debtors of one 
economic subgroup, such as low-income debtors who own homes, 
account for the different rates of choosing Chapter 13.  Although 
blacks and whites of higher incomes choose Chapter 13 more often, 
the differences between low-income blacks and low-income whites 
(and between high-income whites and high-income blacks) is the 
same as the difference between blacks and white debtors as a 
whole.70
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
There are three broad implications of these findings.  First, 
they add a new sector of the court system to the longstanding 
debate about official legal neutrality in the face of disparate racial 
results.  Second, they suggest that independent actors such as the 
U.S. trustee should have a modified role in which they weigh in on 
behalf of unrepresented debtors.  Finally, they underscore the 
importance of shining more light on race in the area of bankruptcy, 
such as through annual reporting of racial data by district. 
68 P < .01.  See id.  
69 See id. 
70 81.5% of blacks making greater than $2,000 per month choose Chapter 13, compared to 
only 59.5% making less than $2,000 per month.  52.5% of whites making greater than $2,000 
per month chose Chapter 13, compared to 33.8% making less than $2,000 per month (P < .01).  
See id.  
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A.  Official neutrality in the face of disparate racial results 
The above results add to the ongoing tension between official 
neutrality and disparate racial results in the legal system.  
Bankruptcy laws, like their counterparts elsewhere in the legal 
system, are officially race-neutral, yet the above numbers paint a 
bleak picture of race in bankruptcy.  Black, Hispanic, and white 
debtors enter bankruptcy with similar measures of class.  They are, 
contrary to stereotypes, “overwhelmingly middle class.”71  Yet far 
more blacks choose a bankruptcy chapter that offers low 
probabilities of bankruptcy relief.72  Then, even just looking at those 
that end up in Chapter 13, a far lower percentage of black and 
Hispanic debtors than white debtors leave with improved prospects 
of maintaining a middle-class lifestyle by holding onto their assets 
and freeing themselves from their debts.73
While the U.S. has moved beyond the days when public 
institutions banned people of color and laws explicitly discriminated 
against them, it has been clear that the replacement system has not 
achieved racially neutral results.  The evidence of a previously 
unconsidered portion of the court system—bankruptcy filings—to 
the list of racially disparate results strengthens the argument for 
the breadth of the problem.  These disparities parallel the larger 
concerns about race as a factor that affects who comes into the legal 
system and how that person is treated once they are there. 
B.  Discretion, Rules, and New Roles 
The data also underscore the complications of the dichotomy 
between rules and discretion in the law.  Discretion creates space 
for racially charged treatment.  Yet rules can do the same even if 
written in an apparently race-neutral manner.74  Thus, increasing 
or decreasing discretion may not solve the problem.  Instead, 
independent actors such as the U.S. trustee should play a more 
active role in evaluating the quality of representation and weighing 
in on behalf of unrepresented debtors. 
One potential way to alleviate actor bias against minorities—
either if it were determined that there was prejudice by bankruptcy 
actors or if society wanted to guard against any potential 
71 Warren, Economics of Race, supra note 9, at 1781. 
72 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
74 See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text. 
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prejudice—would be to include more concrete rules in Chapter 13.  
Bankruptcy operates on often fuzzy and ambiguous standards; for 
example, the laws do not define what “substantial abuse” means, 
which is a ground for dismissing a bankruptcy petition.75  Such 
fuzzy rules could be seen as providing too much discretion for judges 
to dismiss petitions from “truly deserving debtors.”76  Bankruptcy 
scholars have postulated, without considering race, that “this lack of 
clarity increase[s] the risk that . . . otherwise similarly situated 
debtors might receive disparate treatment.”77
Rules, however, can also create opportunities for racial disparity.  
For example, the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code78 made 
it so that educational expenses for dependent children are 
reasonable (and thus allowable in the debtor’s budget) only if the 
child is less than eighteen years of age.79  On its face, this change to 
the Code seems race-neutral, however, it likely makes it 
disproportionately more difficult for minorities to complete Chapter 
13 repayment plans.  Black and Hispanic families are more likely to 
have a child eighteen or older attending high school.80  
Consequently, they are more likely to need to make such expenses 
at some point during the repayment plan.  Since these expenses will 
not be “allowable,” the expenses will need to come out of disposable 
income that will be earmarked for creditors, thus increasing the 
possibility of missed payments and a motion to dismiss the case. 
One improvement that avoids the complications of the 
discretion/rules tension would be to require independent actors to 
advocate on behalf of unrepresented debtors and to evaluate the 
quality of representation.  For example, trustees could be required 
to exercise particular vigilance when the debtor is unrepresented.  
Trustees are already expected to assist the debtor in complying with 
the repayment plan,81 and are “charged with objecting to improper 
creditor claims.”82  Yet the Code specifically says that trustees 
75 R. Wilson Freyermuth, Crystals, Mud, BAPCPA, and the Structure of Bankruptcy 
Decisionmaking, 71 MO. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2006). 
76 Id. at 1071. 
77 Id. 
78 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
79 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (2006).
80 See Shuk Wa Wong & Jan N. Hughes, Ethnicity and Language Contributions to 
Dimensions of Parent Involvement, 35 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 645 (2006) (mentioning that 
among kindergarten through twelfth-grade students, 18% of black and 13% of Hispanic 
students had repeated at least one grade, compared to 9% of whites).
81 See 11 U.S.C. §1302(b)(4) (2006); WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 282. 
82 See 11 U.S.C. §1302(b)(1) (2006); WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 3, at 282. 
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should not advise on legal matters.83  While it would be problematic 
for trustees to give legal advice, in light of the above difference in 
frequency of motions to dismiss, in pro se cases, trustees should be 
charged with weighing in on behalf of debtors and investigating 
more thoroughly the debtors’ ability to pay before making a motion 
to dismiss.  When a party other than the trustee makes a motion to 
dismiss, the trustee should be required to make a statement stating 
the case for and against the motion, thus ensuring that at least one 
informed party will present the debtor’s case to the court.84
C.  Further Attention 
More information about racial disparities and accompanying 
attention is a key step toward remedying the problem, not just in 
bankruptcy, but in other areas of the law.  If more attorneys knew 
of the racial differences, they might put more resources toward pro 
bono representation or attorney education.85  If more judges were 
aware of the differences, they might be quicker to conscript 
attorneys to help the unrepresented or to discipline poor 
attorneys.86  If trustees knew of the differences, they might 
83 See 11 U.S.C. §1302(b)(4) (2006). 
84 Another example of independent actors affecting racial disparity would be making sure 
someone communicates to unrepresented debtors how important it is to have an attorney, 
such as by pointing out those studies that have shown that representation increases the 
chance of receiving a discharge.  Congress could require delivery of the attorney-importance 
message at the mandatory credit counseling session or at some other point in conjunction 
with the court filings.  Rather than communicating to all debtors, a court clerk could simply 
check for those few debtors without representation and accordingly send a message. 
85 Pro bono efforts by individual lawyers and bar associations have fallen short overall.  
See SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD: PROBLEMS, 
LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 70 (2004).  Funding for legal aid services has been 
drastically cut over the past two decades.  Id. at 70–71.  Though ideally this trend would be 
reversed, at least for bankruptcy, members of the current Congress have only shown an 
inclination to cut further.  See id. at 63.  Philanthropic support for legal aid could help if more 
donors were made aware of the problem; after all, philanthropy in recent years has 
increasingly looked to fund entrepreneurial endeavors.  See, e.g., Laura Koss-Feder, An 
Investment with Meaning, TIME, Apr. 9, 2007, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1604868,00.html.  And historically 
bankruptcy relief has been linked to entrepreneurship because it enables risk-taking.  See, 
e.g., John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 436–38 (2000). 
86 Because the same lawyers come before the same judges time after time, bankruptcy 
judges are in a particularly good position to conscript attorneys.  Moreover, the realities of 
Chapter 13 meet the general American judicial standards for when judges should compel a 
lawyer to represent someone in a non-criminal suit.  Judges’ “power to conscript 
lawyers . . . exists for two primary purposes: (1) to ensure a ‘fair and just’ adjudicative 
process . . . and (2) to maintain the integrity and viability of the . . . entire civil justice 
system.”  See MARTYN & FOX, supra note 85, at 62.  Though either of these is alone enough to 
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intervene on behalf of debtors more often. 
One way to generate more information and thus attention about 
the issue would be to require districts to collect and annually report 
racial data.  In bankruptcy, this would mean reporting the number 
of filings, which chapter those filings were in, how many motions of 
what kind were made, and each plan’s outcome. 
This data would make it possible to conduct further studies on 
key areas such as the causes of motions.  For example, one helpful 
source of information would be how many days late the payments 
were before the trustee made the motion to dismiss.  If the motions 
are for payments late by an average of forty days for whites and 
twenty-five days for blacks, it would suggest actor bias.  If, on the 
other hand, the days are comparable, it would suggest independent 
social factors are playing a larger role. 
Moreover, because a few trustees are involved in many cases, 
future studies should look at the role of individual trustees.  Studies 
could examine whether some trustees consistently make motions 
with the same frequency regardless of the debtor’s race, whereas 
other trustees consistently make more motions only for certain 
races.  An investigation into certain trustees who consistently 
demonstrate more aggressive pursuit of minorities than whites 
would not only provide information, but could also spotlight any 
problematic actors in the bankruptcy machinery. 
It would also be helpful to investigate why blacks and Hispanics 
are less likely to be represented, and if there are any differences in 
the quality of attorney representation between the races.  One cause 
of the disparate percentages of representation could be that 
bankruptcy attorneys do not advertise to minority communities as 
often as they do to white communities.  Advertising has been found 
to play a critical role, especially for certain segments of the 
population, in access to legal services.87
justify conscription, both apply in the current situation.  Disparate racial impact due to lack 
of representation clearly offends the adversarial system’s ability to meet the standard of “just 
and fair.”  See id. at 63.  Furthermore, one factor in determining whether this standard is met 
is “equal access to adequate legal assistance.”  See id.  Minority debtors arguably have 
unequal access compared to two groups: creditors, who are likely to have attorneys because of 
their wealth, and whites, because attorneys tend to be less available in minority communities.  
Given that equal representation would help close the gap in Chapter 13 completion rates and 
thus increase the bankruptcy system’s fairness, conscription of lawyers would serve this 
second goal of preserving the judicial system. 
87 See Richard J. Cebula, Historical and Economic Perspectives on Lawyer Advertising and 
Lawyer Image, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 328 (1998) (noting that “advertising has become an 
important way for certain segments of the population, especially the poor, less educated, and 
younger segments, to obtain access to legal services”). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has put forth data about outcomes for debtors of 
different races, and possible explanations for such data.  It would be 
irresponsible to charge racism of any bankruptcy institution or 
actors at this point.  What the above numbers do suggest, however, 
is that the problem of racial disparity in the court system extends 
further than was evidenced before.  Furthermore, there is a great 
need to look more deeply into racial disparity in bankruptcy, 
especially in Chapter 13.  Chapter 13 has long received less 
attention from scholars than Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 and is poorly 
understood even by many experts in the field.  Minority debtors are 
far less likely to obtain a Chapter 13 discharge even when 
controlling for factors such as income, employment, homeownership, 
and education.  BAPCPA will only exacerbate this problem by 
removing for many debtors the option of entering a clearly race-
neutral Chapter 7, and by introducing arguably minority-unfriendly 
definitions of allowable expenses. 
But there is also good news that comes with awareness of this 
particular danger.  Greater awareness of the problem is the first 
step toward the attention necessary to remedy it.  In bankruptcy, 
solving the problem would also serve a broad set of interests.  
Creditors would benefit from a system that does not reject what 
could otherwise be successful minority debtors from Chapter 13, 
since those debtors would otherwise pay back a larger portion of 
their debts over the repayment period.  Judges, lawyers, and other 
bankruptcy actors would benefit from changes that would maintain 
the viability and integrity of the system.  Finally, and most 
importantly, the changes would make a difference in the lives of 
many minorities by ensuring them equal opportunity for a fresh 
start when their lives are turned upside down by unpredictable 
events—an opportunity vital to their full participation in the risk-
laden American economy. 
It is also good news that there is no evidence that any of this is 
intentional; Congress, for example, surely wrote BAPCPA thinking 
it was race-neutral.  Nor are the various actors—whether 
bankruptcy lawyers in their choice of advertising, or trustees in 
their motions—necessarily aware of the racially disparate impact of 
bankruptcy laws.  Before the data from this study was available, 
those parties had an understandable excuse of a veil of darkness.  
Consequently, as this veil is lifted, there is reason to believe that 
decision-makers will take steps to ensure that the ladder out of 
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indebtedness is not being unfairly knocked from underneath 
minority debtors. 
What veils of darkness remain elsewhere in the legal system are 
unknown.  But given the feasibility of collecting information on race 
in other areas of the law and the light that such information sheds 
on race in bankruptcy, there is reason to look for other areas of the 
law in need of spotlights.  And just as the racially charged images 
following Hurricane Katrina raised awareness and directed 
resources toward lessening racial challenges facing communities 
such as New Orleans, such spotlights could similarly direct 
resources toward lessening racial differences in the legal system as 
a whole. 
 
